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Abstract
Quine is frequently acknowledged as one of the main proponents of both 
confi rmation holism and underdetermination. In the recent literature, however, 
his views have been often criticized and misrepresented: the distinction 
between the two theses has been often blurred, the obviousness of holism 
has been rejected, and the plausibility of underdetermination has come under 
attack. This paper attempts to formulate both theses as clearly as possible and 
to defend Quine’s views against some recurrent criticisms. In particular, it is 
argued that Quine’s theses are signifi cantly weaker than they have been taken 
to be and that only confi rmation holism, but not underdetermination, plays a 
fundamental role in his philosophy.
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Resumo
Quine é frequentemente reconhecido como um dos principais proponentes tanto 
do holismo confi rmacional quanto da subdeterminação. Na literatura recente, 
entretanto, suas concepções têm sido com frequência criticadas e representadas 
de forma distorcida: a distinção entre as duas teses tem sido com frequência 
ofuscada, o caráter óbvio do holismo tem sido rejeitado e a plausibilidade da 
subdeterminação tem sido atacada. Este artigo tenta reformular ambas as 
teses tão claramente quanto possível e defende a concepção de Quine contra 
lgumas críticas recorrentes. Em particular, argumenta-se que as teses de Quine 
são signifi cativamente mais fracas do que têm sido sido interpretadas, e que 
apenas o holismo confi rmacional, mas não a subdeterminação, desempenha 
um papel fundamental em sua fi losofi a.
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Introduction
Confirmation holism and underdetermination have been very much associ-
ated with Quine’s philosophy.2 In ‘Two Dogmas’ (1980 [1951]), Quine presented 
confirmation holism as an alternative, or “countersuggestion” (p. 41), to the dogma 
of reductionism, the view that the empirical content of individual cognitive state-
ments can each be reduced to statements containing only terms for sense-data 
and logical terms. More generally, holism is an alternative to the view – sometimes 
dubbed “atomism” – that each statement is endowed with an empirical content of 
its own.3 Against atomism, holism says instead that in general empirical content 
attaches not to individual sentences or terms but to more or less large sets of 
sentences, the whole of science or “chunks” of it (Quine, 1980, p. 268), i.e. to sets 
of sentences large enough to entail empirically testable sentences.4 Throughout 
Quine’s work, holism is presented as a trivial doctrine, undeniable, and obviously 
true. In response to an objection by Grünbaum, for example, Quine wrote: 
For my own part I would say that the thesis [of confi rmation holism] as I have used 
it is probably trivial. I haven’t advanced it as an interesting thesis as such. I bring it 
in only in the course of arguing against such notions as that the empirical content of 
sentences can in general be sorted out distributively, sentence by sentence, or that 
the understanding of a term can be segregated from collateral information regarding 
the object (1976b, p. 132).
In later writings the obviousness of the doctrine is reaffirmed; in Quine (1992, 
p. 16) for example, he wrote that “[i]t is difficult to see how anyone can question 
holism, in the sense now before us”.5
Confirmation holism is a fundamental doctrine of Quine’s thought. Most 
aspects of his philosophy are directly affected by it: for example, Quine’s qualms 
about Carnap’s use of the analytic-synthetic distinction, the theses of indetermi-
nacy of translation and ontological relativity, naturalized epistemology and Quine’s 
overall conception of philosophy as continuous with science. Despite Quine’s 
characterization of holism as trivially and obviously true, some of its implications 
have seemed unbelievable to some of his readers. Of those implications, perhaps 
the most polemical is the claim that scientific theories are underdetermined by 
observations: the so-called thesis of underdetermination. Quine himself did not 
maintain that confirmation holism entails underdetermination, but merely that it 
renders underdetermination plausible (1975, p. 313). Unlike confirmation holism, 
underdetermination is not trivially true, and both its formulation and justification 
are controversial.6 Even within Quine’s philosophy, underdetermination is neither 
2 Prior to Quine, Duhem (1954 [1914]) had defended confi rmation holism, and for that reason it is also known 
as the “Duhem-Quine thesis”. Duhem’s version of the thesis is narrower in scope than Quine’s, however (see 
below). Some authors distinguish “confi rmation holism” and “meaning holism” (see, e.g., De Rosa and Lepore, 
2004, p. 66), but this paper is concerned primarily with the former. 
3 See Fodor and Lepore (1992, chapter 2), and Hylton (2002, p. 12-13; 2007, chapter 3).
4 In a well-known passage of ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine wrote that “our statements about the external world face 
the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (p. 41). The suggestion was that 
only theories as a whole have empirical content. In later works, Quine mitigated the thesis. In Quine (1991), 
for example, he refers to those statements as a “needlessly strong” (p. 268) assertion of holism, and concedes 
that empirical content can attach also to portions and branches of science, and to individual observation 
sentences and observation categoricals. See also Quine (1969, p. 79).
5 See also Quine (1975, p. 313-314).
6 For discussion, see Laudan and Leplin (1991), Norton (1993, 1994), Hoefer and Rosenberg (1994), Kukla 
(1998), Stanford (2001), Okasha (2002), and Magnus (2003).
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trivially true nor a fundamental doctrine, and it does not affect other aspects of his 
philosophy in the same pervasive way holism does. 
Something similar to what we see in Quine can also be seen in the philoso-
phy of science literature more generally: in its more modest versions, confirmation 
holism is quite widely accepted, whereas the thesis of underdetermination remains 
problematic. The former is nonetheless generally perceived as suggesting some ver-
sion or other of the thesis of underdetermination, at least prima facie, even by those 
who then go on to reject it. Some of the authors who reject underdetermination 
have also come to question holism itself, especially if the two theses are perceived 
as entailing some sort of uncertainty about the results of science.7 Oftentimes those 
criticisms are facilitated by characterizations of the two theses which systematically 
blur their differences. An example of this kind of blurring can be found in Laudan 
(1990), who defines “Quinean underdetermination” as the thesis that “[a]ny theory 
can be reconciled with any recalcitrant evidence by making suitable adjustments in 
our other assumptions about nature” (p. 274). As we shall see below, at best this 
is a statement with which Quine would reluctantly agree only insofar as it is an im-
precise characterization of confirmation holism, but not as a statement of the thesis 
of underdetermination, as Laudan suggests.8 Underdetermination is not a thesis 
about the reconciliation of hypotheses or theories with observations, but about the 
possibility of alternative theories that predict the same observations. Strictly speak-
ing, the thesis stated by Laudan is false even as a characterization of confirmation 
holism, since some theories clearly imply false observation categoricals and are 
therefore irreconcilable with observations. Quine’s thesis of confirmation holism 
says rather that individual hypotheses or sentences – but not whole theories, or at 
least not global theories – can be reconciled with observations by making adjust-
ments in other sentences of the original theory, or in the original background and 
ordinary assumptions. Adjustments to a theory as a whole yield new theories, not 
the same theory; so the claim cannot simply be that any theory can be reconciled 
with any evidence.
The main goal of this paper is to formulate both confirmation holism and un-
derdetermination as clearly as possible, sorting out the connections and differences 
between the two. In so doing, we shall be arguing against authors who have blurred 
the distinction between them and laying out the ground for a defense of moder-
ate versions of both. The second section introduces confirmation holism, focusing 
primarily on Quine’s formulation; the next section briefly recalls the origins of this 
thesis in Duhem’s work and in Quine’s reaction to Carnap’s project in the Aufbau; 
the following section formulates the thesis of underdetermination and explains why 
confirmation holism renders it plausible but is insufficient to establish it; and the 
final section outlines some of the main consequences of each thesis.
Confirmation holism
Both confirmation holism and underdetermination have been variously for-
mulated. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to speak of theses of confirmation 
holism and theses of underdetermination instead, since those formulations are not 
all equivalent. Broadly speaking, confirmation holism may be understood as saying 
that empirical content attaches in general not to individual sentences but to more 
or less large sets of sentences. 
7 An example is Norton (1994).
8 Similar confusions can be found in Kitcher (1993, p. 251), and Leplin (1997, p. 210). 
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This initial characterization turns on the notion of ‘empirical content’, which 
may not be immediately clear. In the debates on the topic, the content of a sentence 
or set of sentences is usually taken to be the set of sentences which it implies that 
are neither logically valid nor analytic.9 Logically valid and analytic sentences are 
thought to follow from any other sentence or set of sentences, regardless of what 
those say. If the notion of ‘content’ is to play a useful role, it must be capable of 
setting apart the logically valid and analytic sentences implied by a sentence or set 
of sentences from the other sentences that they imply. In determining the content 
of “there are zebras in Africa”, for example, it is irrelevant that “it is raining or not 
raining”, or that “no bachelors are married” logically follow from it. On the other 
hand, it is relevant that some synthetic and logically invalid sentences also follow 
from it. For example, “there are zebras in Africa” implies that “there are mammals 
in Africa” and “there are vertebrates in Africa”. So the content of a sentence can be 
characterized as the set of logically invalid and synthetic sentences that it implies. 
This definition can be trivially extended to sets of sentences: the set of logically 
invalid and synthetic sentences that follow from a given set of sentences. 
The notion of ‘content’ can then be used to define the empirical content of a 
sentence or set of sentences: not the set of logically invalid and synthetic sentences 
that are implied by a given sentence or set of sentences, but some favored subset 
of such sentences held to be confirmed or refuted by observations. Naturally, there 
is much room here for divergencies about which sentences are actually confirmed 
or refuted by observations, and even about what counts as an observation. It is 
not clear whether any precise borderline can be conceived, even in principle. In an 
attempt to circumvent those difficulties, Quine avoids talking of observations and 
of sentences being confirmed (or refuted) by observations. He settles instead for 
the notions of ‘observation sentences’ and ‘observation categoricals’. Observation 
sentences are sentences like “It’s raining”, “It’s getting cold”, and “That’s a rab-
bit”. They are occasion sentences, true on some occasions and false on others, and 
[...] should command the subject’s assent or dissent outright, on the occasion of a 
stimulation in the appropriate range, without further investigation and independently 
of what he may have been engaged in at the time. A further requirement is intersub-
jectivity: unlike the report of a feeling, the sentence must command the same verdict 
from all linguistically competent witnesses of the occasion (Quine, 1992, p. 3).
What Quine calls “observation categoricals” are general sentences of made up 
of observation sentences.10 These are sentences of the form “Whenever this, that”: 
“Whenever there is smoke, there is fire”, for example. The “whenever”, Quine notes, 
[...] is not intended to reify times and quantify over them. What is intended is an ir-
reducible generality prior to any objective reference. It is a generality to the effect that 
the circumstances described in one observation sentence are invariably accompanied 
by those described in the other (1992, p. 10).
As such, Quine argues, observation categoricals can be learned very early on, 
even by a child before she has fully acquired something like quantification theory. 
9 See, for example, Carnap (2002, § 49) and Sellars (1980, p. 266). There are various ways of characterizing the 
‘analyticity’, but this issue is not particularly relevant here. But see Coffa (1991) for an historical reconstruction; 
Quine’s views can be found in Quine (1980, 1976a, 1992, p. 54-56).
10 In works published in the 1970s and before, Quine was using the “less fruitful” notion of ‘observation 
conditional’, which is made up not of observation sentences, but of “standing sentences”. For further clarification 
and discussion, see Quine (1981, p. 26-27).
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They are unlike observation sentences in that they are not occasion sentences, but 
standing sentences, true or false once and for all. They can be immediately rejected if 
some occurrence of the first occasion is not followed by an occurrence of the second; 
and command assent if the relevant occurrences systematically follow one another 
in the right order. As such, they play a crucial role in the testing of scientific theories. 
Scientific theories typically do not imply observation sentences, since most theories 
comprise general statements or laws only, which cannot entail statements about par-
ticular occasions but only general relations among occasion types. Scientific theories 
do, however, imply observation categoricals, and it is by way of these that they come 
to be tested. Such, at least, is the way Quine broadly conceives the relations between 
theories and observations (see 1975, p. 314 ff., 1981, p. 24-30, 1991, p. 268).
Given these characterizations of content, observation sentences, and obser-
vation categoricals, Quine defines the notion of ‘empirical content’ rather straight-
forwardly as follows:
Call an observation sentence analytic for a given speaker if, as in ‘Robins are birds’, 
the affi rmative stimulus meaning for him of the one component is included in that of 
the other. Otherwise synthetic. Call a sentence or set of sentences testable if it implies 
some synthetic observation categoricals. Call two observation categoricals synonymous 
if their respective components have the same stimulus meanings. Then the empirical 
content of a testable sentence or set of sentences for that speaker is the set of all the 
synthetic observation categoricals that it implies, plus all synonymous ones. I add the 
synonymous ones so that merely verbal variation will not obstruct sameness of content. 
Having thus defi ned empirical content and hence empirical equivalence for the indi-
vidual speaker, we can call two sentences or sets of sentences equivalent for a whole 
community when equivalent for each member (1992, p. 16-17).
Quine offers no definition of the empirical content of sentences that are not 
testable, or for theories that do not imply testable observation categoricals because 
of vagueness in the formulation. Yet he nonetheless uses a related, more loosely 
defined notion in contexts where they are involved: 
[...] much solid experimental science fails testability in the defi ned sense. This can hap-
pen [...] because of vague and uncalibrated probabilities in the backlog of theory. No 
doubt it happens also in more complex ways, not clearly understood. I have no defi ni-
tion of empirical content to offer for such theories, but it still seems to make reasonable 
intuitive sense to speak of empirical equivalence among them, since experimentation 
is still brought to bear. The idea is that whatever observation would be counted for 
or against the one theory counts equally for or against the other (1992, p. 95-96).11
Given Quine’s definition of empirical content, it follows that meaning holism and 
confirmation holism are just two aspects of a single thesis, which can be stated thus: 
scientific, or cognitive, sentences in general lack empirical content when considered 
individually, or in isolation from other sentences. In general they do not, on their own, 
imply observation sentences or synthetic observation categoricals. The “in general” 
above is needed to accommodate two exceptions. The first is that some scientific 
statements are themselves observation sentences or synthetic observation categoricals. 
Since they imply themselves, they do have an empirical content of their own even 
11 This extended use of the notion of ‘empirical equivalence’ appears in Quine’s formulation of the thesis 
of underdetermination; some of the diffi culties associated with that thesis turn on the extended use of the 
notion. More on this issue below.
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when considered individually. The second exception is that individual sentences that 
lack empirical content may be conjoined into longer sentences that do have empirical 
content. One may even conjoin all the sentences that make up a scientific theory, or 
large portions of them, into a very long conjunctive sentence. That sentence would 
then have an empirical content of its own (see Quine, 1998a, p. 620).
Granted those two exceptions, confirmation holism has an almost trivial 
justification. Most sentences that make up the corpus of a scientific theory can 
only imply observation sentences and synthetic observation categoricals together 
with a number of other sentences and ordinary assumptions. Take, for example, 
the statement that most living plants produce oxygen in the presence of sunlight. 
This is true of most living plants, but false of some plants that are parasitic on other 
plants, and of some plants which extract their nutrients from dead organic matter. 
The general claim on its own, however, implies no observation sentences or synthetic 
observation categoricals, since it says nothing about what oxygen is and how one 
detects it or what living plants are and how they are identified. In the absence of 
such specifications, the claim that most living plants produce oxygen in the pres-
ence of sunlight fails to imply any observation sentence or synthetic observation 
categorical. A very large number of sentences is needed for that implication to 
obtain, including sentences specifying what oxygen and plants are. Only together 
can those sentences have some empirical content. But once those sentences are 
added, what one has is a whole theory, or at least a significant portion of a theory.
Confirmation holism is even more obvious if one considers sentences which 
are steeped into the more theoretical realms of science, such as sentences about 
subatomic particles or about the most general features of space-time. Think, for 
example, of Einstein’s famous statement that E=mc2. The truth of that claim can 
only begin to be ascertained once one has some specification of what to count 
as energy, mass, and the speed of light, and how to identify and measure those 
things. Hence, a number of additional sentences, most of them also theoretical in 
nature, have to be brought in for the original one to imply a synthetic observation 
categorical and thus be tested. In fact, if we were to regard Einstein’s statement 
in isolation, it could hardly be thought to have any meaning at all. Only in the 
context of a theory can we more or less specify what the sentence says and what 
has to be the case for it to be true. Strictly speaking, the sentence itself, on its 
own, makes no claim upon reality; only the theory of which it is part, or more or 
less large portions of that theory, can be said to make such a claim.
In ordinary scientific practice, a background theory is commonly presup-
posed each time terms such as ‘energy’ and ‘mass’ are used. Given those back-
ground assumptions, theoretical sentences like Einstein’s above may perhaps 
be thought to imply synthetic observation categoricals, even when considered 
in isolation from other sentences. Confirmation holism does not have to be 
thought as denying that. Rather, it merely calls attention to those background 
presuppositions; it says that without them, theoretical sentences cannot imply 
synthetic observation categoricals. Moreover, it says that, in general, for those 
implications to obtain, the assumptions built into the use of theoretical terms 
have to be fairly large in number and encompass a wide stretch of the theory or 
theories of which they are part. Assertion of a theoretical sentence oftentimes 
presupposes the assertion of a large portion of a theory, or at least of a system 
of interrelated sentences.12
12 Quine’s holism is – in this regard at least – very much akin to a point later made by Wittgenstein: “What I 
hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions” (1969, § 225). For a comparative discussion of 
Wittgenstein and Quine on this particular issue, see Gibson Jr. (1996).
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One important and immediate consequence of confirmation holism is that 
if a theory implies an observation categorical that is disconfirmed by observations, 
no individual sentence of the theory is thereby immediately refuted. Rather, what 
is refuted is the theory, or system of sentences as a whole, together with whichever 
ordinary assumptions played a role in implying the failed observation categorical. 
Confirmation holism can thus be thought to complement the claim that scientific 
hypotheses, because of their generality, cannot be verified by any finite number of 
observations. It complements that claim by saying that theoretical hypotheses, on 
their own, cannot be refuted either. Only theories as wholes, or portions of them 
large enough to imply observation sentences or synthetic observation categoricals 
can be refuted by observations. Confirmation holism still entail that theories as 
wholes can be refuted, however.
In the presence of an adverse observation, the scientist is more or less at 
liberty about which part of his theory to revise, and he may also choose to keep 
the theory as it is and revise some ordinary assumptions which may have played a 
role in implying the false categorical. He is of course constrained by the weight and 
strength that he assigns to various portions of his theory and ordinary assumptions, 
and by certain maxims of theory construction (such as simplicity, conservatism, 
generality, and fecundity). Nonetheless, in the face of a counterexample, a scientist 
always must decide between various courses of action, even if all but one of the 
alternatives seems reasonable to him at that moment.13 He may choose to retain the 
hypothesis under scrutiny and revise some of the assumptions of his experiment, 
or perhaps some more fundamental tenets of his theory. More frequently, he will 
retain the experimental results and the basic assumptions of his theory and revise 
only the specific hypothesis he set out to test. These considerations are confirmed by 
the practice of experimental scientists, who typically devise a number of alternative 
explanations for why an experiment may not have come out as expected. 
Some statements are of course more easily revised than others. What I claim 
to see now in front of me may be revised in the light of what I come to see later 
on. Other sentences are not as easily given up. The general laws and principles of 
natural science, for example, are typically upheld for a long time. And the sentences 
of elementary logic and mathematics, because they are common to all branches 
of science, can only be revised at the cost of making considerable adjustments 
throughout science. They are thus only very seldom changed. Nevertheless, changes 
in logic and in number theory have indeed occurred, and to a large degree they 
were justified by the overall benefits they brought to science. Typical examples 
were the introduction of negative numbers – thought to be absurd by thinkers 
such as Descartes – and the development of infinitesimal calculus.
These rather trivial remarks make up the core of Quine’s thesis of confirmation 
holism. But they were also the source of, or the motivation for, some controversial 
claims which we find in Quine’s “Two dogmas”: 
The unit of empirical signifi cance is the whole of science (1980, p. 42).
[A]ny statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjust-
ments elsewhere in the system. [...] Conversely, by the same token, no statement is 
immune to revision (1980, p. 43).
13 In many cases, it is in fact rather inappropriate to speak of a decision. Oftentimes the scientist will not even 
say that there are alternatives. This does not contradict holism; it just shows that in many cases the background 
theory held at the moment is thought to be beyond reasonable doubt, thus ruling out alternatives which would 
otherwise be thought to be relevant. For discussion on how evidence may constrain a scientist’s options, see 
Norton (1993, 1994), and Massimi (2004).
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Most of the criticisms of Quine on holism that one finds in the literature aim 
at those two passages. Quine himself, however, would later describe those claims 
as a “needlessly strong” (1991, p. 268). They are true, he adds, in a “legalistic sort 
of way” (1991, p. 268), but they divert attention from what is more fundamental. 
Holism is an alternative to the claim that the empirical content of a theory can be 
sorted out distributively among the sentences and terms that comprise it. To con-
travene that claim, it suffices to say that some sentences of a theory, on their own, 
lack empirical content. There is no need to further claim or suppose that empirical 
content attaches only to the whole of science. Clusters of sentences “sufficient to 
imply an observable effect of an observable experimental condition” (1991, p. 268) 
can also be thought as having an empirical content, even if they do not comprise 
the whole of science. It is true that science is considerably integrated, and that some 
components, such as elementary logic and mathematics, are common to all branches. 
But we can appreciate this degree of integration and still appreciate how unrealistic it 
would be to extend a Duhemian holism to the whole of science, taking all science as the 
unit that is responsible to observation. Science is neither discontinuous nor monolithic. It 
is variously jointed, and loose in the joints in varying degrees. In the face of a recalcitrant 
observation we are free to choose what statements to revise and what ones to hold 
fast, and these alternatives will disrupt various stretches of scientifi c theory in various 
ways, varying in severity. Little is gained by saying that the unit is in principle the whole 
of science, however defensible this claim may be in a legalistic way (1975, p. 314-315).
In his writings after “Two dogmas”, Quine would likewise maintain that, le-
galistically speaking, it remains true that any individual statement can be revised or 
abandoned without affecting the net empirical implications of the resulting theory, so 
long as adjustments are made elsewhere in the theory or background assumptions. 
In the actual practice of working scientists, however, a large number of statements are 
effectively shielded from revisions because of their centrality to the theories accepted 
at that moment, or because they are directly confirmed by a very large number of 
observations. Scientists only subject a few statements to scrutiny at any given mo-
ment, and this is crucial for the development of the scientific enterprise. Revisions in 
statements that are central to the whole of science require a very large number of 
adjustments throughout, and alternatives to those statements are oftentimes unavail-
able at a given moment. These difficulties counsel against revisions, whenever possible. 
Quine offers these considerations as an explanation of the perceived ‘necessity’ of 
some theoretical statements; for example, those of mathematics: 
[...] mathematics infi ltrates all branches of our system of the world, and its disruption 
would reverberate intolerably. If asked why he spares mathematics, the scientist will 
perhaps say that its laws are necessarily true; but I think we have here an explanation, 
rather, of mathematical necessity itself. It resides in our unstated policy of shielding 
mathematics by exercising our freedom to reject other beliefs instead (1992, p. 15).
Revisions in those central statements occur only very seldom in the history 
of science, and while they occur other statements are maintained as they are.14 
14 A more or less clear illustration of this point can be found in the revision of our notions of space and time 
brought about by contemporary physics. The classical notions of space and time were indeed very central 
to modern science and philosophy; they were sometimes described as necessary and a priori notions – for 
example, by Kant – and revisions of them were thought to be absurd or impossible to philosophers up to the 
early nineteenth century. In 1827, Ferdinand Möbius, for example, rejected the idea of spaces with more than 
three dimensions because, he wrote, they “cannot be thought” (1991, p. 40-41). Spaces with more than three 
dimensions are nowadays routinely posited by string theories, for example.
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Revisions of statements directly linked to systematic (widely repeated) observations 
also require a large number of adjustments and are likewise shielded from revisions. 
In principle, or legalistically speaking, they are possible and have happened in the 
history of science.15
Quine replaced his “needlessly strong” assertion of holism in “Two dogmas” 
with a more modest one in later works, which stresses what he calls the “empirical 
bias” of science, on the one hand, and the centrality of some theoretical sentences 
to the system of science as a whole:
[...] the scientist does occasionally revoke even an observation statement, when it con-
fl icts with a well attested body of theory and when he has tried in vain to reproduce 
the experiment. But the Duhem thesis would be wrong if understood as imposing an 
equal status on all the statements in a scientifi c theory and thus denying the strong 
presumption in favor of the observation statements. It is a bias that makes science 
empirical (1975, p. 314).16
Once these qualifications to confirmation holism are granted, the thesis turns 
out to be quite modest, and its justification rather straightforward. Nonetheless, 
it has far-reaching consequences, not the least of which is the inseparability of 
questions of meaning from empirical questions (thus the inseparability of mean-
ing holism and confirmation holism in Quine), and the difficulties it raises for the 
traditional notion of ‘a priori’.17 
A stronger version of the thesis, criticized by Grünbaum (1960, 1962) and 
sometimes thought to have been suggested by the controversial passages in “Two 
dogmas” quoted above, says that in the face of adverse observations any statement 
can be held true by revising the accepted theory and ordinary assumptions so that 
the threatened hypothesis together with the revised theory will imply the observa-
tion categorical whose negation was implied by the original theory. Quine explicitly 
acknowledges Grünbaum’s criticism, granting him the point while maintaining his 
own version of the thesis: “Inactivating the false implication is all that is at stake” 
(1992, p. 16).18
Quine’s confirmation holism merely says that given an hypothesis H, an ac-
cepted theory T, and a synthetic observation categorical O which is found to be 
false, if (H and T) implies O, then one can revise H and T and come up with H’ and 
T’ such that (H’ and T’) does not imply O. Moreover, one should also be able to 
come up with at least one alternative revision, say, H’’ and T’’, such that (H’’ and 
T’’) does not imply O either. The stronger version of holism criticized by Grünbaum 
says instead that in the face of adverse observations H and T can be revised so that 
(H’ and T’) implies not-O, and likewise for (H’’ and T’’). The latter, stronger version 
of holism is not trivially true, since alternative theories that imply a given observa-
tion are not always easy to come by. Oftentimes, in the history of science, some 
observations remain anomalous for considerable periods of time. Coming up with 
theories that can predict and explain such anomalies is not a requirement of Quine’s 
thesis, which merely says that alternative ways of preventing a theory from entail-
ing a false observation categorical are always available. To prevent an implication 
15 An example is the belief that the Sun moves around the Earth. That belief was, in ancient times, thought to 
be rather closely tied to the observation of the Sun moving across the sky every day.
16 See also Quine (1995, chapter 4).
17 For further discussion, see Harman (1996, 2003), and Hylton (2002, 2004, 2007).
18 See also Quine (1976b, p. 132, 1990b, p. 11-12). Laudan (1990, p. 271 ff.), Kitcher (1993, p. 250), and 
Leplin (1997, p. 210), however, have insisted in assigning to Quine the stronger version of confirmation holism 
criticized by Grünbaum, despite Quine’s explicit disavowals.
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from obtaining it suffices to weaken one or more sentences of the accepted theory 
or of the hypothesis under consideration. Whereas “[e]xplaining the unexpected 
counter-observation is quite another step of scientific progress, which may or may 
not be made in the fullness of time” (Quine, 1992, p. 16). 
Duhem and Carnap
Prior to Quine, confirmation holism had already been put forth by Duhem: 
A physicist decides to demonstrate the inaccuracy of a proposition [...] The prediction 
of the phenomenon, whose nonproduction is to cut off debate, does not derive from 
the propositions challenged if taken by itself, but from the proposition at issue joined 
to [a] whole group of theories; if the predicted phenomenon is not produced, not 
only is the proposition questioned at fault, but so is the whole theoretical scaffolding 
used by the physicist. The only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the 
propositions used to predict the phenomenon and to establish whether it would be 
produced, there is at least one error; but where this error lies is just what it does not 
tell us (Duhem, 1954, p. 185).
Duhem’s thesis has a narrower scope than Quine’s, however. Duhem takes 
confirmation holism to be true of theoretical hypotheses in physics and a few other 
areas of natural science that are sufficiently removed from ordinary experience; but 
he takes it to be false of mathematics and logic, on the one hand, and of physiology, 
certain branches of chemistry, and other disciplines which are more closely tied to 
observations than theoretical physics. In these disciplines, he wrote, it is expected of 
the scientist that he “establish an absolute separation or watertight compartment 
between the consequences of his theoretical deductions and the establishing of the 
facts shown by his experiments” (Duhem, 1954, p. 182), whereas in physics such 
separation cannot exist: “it is impossible to leave outside the laboratory door the 
theory that we wish to test, for without theory it is impossible to regulate a single 
instrument or to interpret a single reading” (Duhem, 1954, p. 182). In theoreti-
cal physics, he concludes, only “whole theoretical groups” can be tested, isolated 
hypotheses cannot.
Duhem argues that, contrary to what happens in theoretical physics, the 
results of experiments in physiology, for example, do not presuppose a theoreti-
cal (physiological) explanation of the workings of the equipment used in the ex-
periments. Experiments in physiology can thus be regarded as establishing facts 
regardless of what theories in physiology might lead one to expect as the right 
outcome of those experiments. Observations would in that sense override theoretical 
hypotheses. Similarly, but on the other end of the spectrum, in mathematics and 
logic, a strict separation also exists between theory and observation. In this case, 
however, observations would be completely immaterial: in establishing the truths 
of mathematics and logic, experiments do not matter. 
While reading Duhem nowadays, one is forcefully reminded of changes that 
chemistry and physiology, as well as math and logic, have undergone in the century 
that has passed since he wrote his work. Nowadays, chemistry and physiology are 
as theoretical as almost all other branches of natural science, and the separation 
Duhem speaks about has become much harder to detect, if it exists at all. Also, 
physics seems now even more tightly connected to the developments in mathemat-
ics and logic than it was in Duhem’s time. As Quine would often note (for example: 
1980, p. 43), alternative logics have been proposed as ways of dealing with empirical 
problems brought about by quantum mechanics. 
106
Filosofi a Unisinos, 13(2):96-113, may/aug 2012
Rogério Passos Severo
Quine’s confirmation holism is, accordingly, broader in scope than Duhem’s: 
it purports to hold in all branches of science, including math and logic. It is likely 
that this difference between Duhem and Quine is at least in part due to the scientific 
developments that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, which only 
Quine witnessed. Duhem must have had in mind the science of his time, which was 
a lot less theoretical than it later became. Quine himself also connects the differ-
ence between his version of the thesis and Duhem’s to his own “view of common 
sense as primitive scientific theory” (1998a, p. 619) and his realistic attitude towards 
the theoretical entities and principles posited by science, as opposed to Duhem’s 
fictionalistic attitude. Duhem, like others in the first half of the twentieth century, 
thought that the physical hypotheses positing theoretical entities and principles 
were strictly speaking neither true nor false, but symbolic approximations intended 
to facilitate or produce adequate predictions of observations.19 Quine, on the other 
hand, thought of the posits of science as on a par with directly observable objects 
posited by common sense, such as chairs and tables: “Science is a continuation of 
common sense, and it continues the common-sense expedient of swelling ontology 
to simplify theory” (1980, p. 45).20 
Duhem originally developed his version of confirmation holism in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Quine’s views were developed independently 
in the 1930s and 1940s,21 as a reaction to his reading of Carnap’s Aufbau.22 On 
Quine’s reading, Carnap fully embraced a reductionist project in the Aufbau, which 
aimed at translating, and thus reducing, all of science into logic and observation 
terms (1969, p. 76). Quine praises Carnap as “the first empiricist who, not content 
with asserting the reducibility of science to terms of immediate experience, took 
serious steps toward carrying out the reduction” (1980, p. 39).23 
The Aufbau, however, contains only a very rough guide on how to proceed in 
order actually to produce a reduction of science into logic and observation terms. 
Yet, even apart from sketchiness, the project as laid down by Carnap turned out to 
be unviable. Only a few years after its publication Carnap had already substantially 
weakened it.24 On Quine’s reading, the project failed because it could not fulfill 
its promise of “specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate 
the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it” (1980, p. 39).25 
The crucial problem is made evident in sections 126 and 127 of the Aufbau, where 
19 The following passage by Einstein illustrates this point: “[The general theory of relativity] revealed that is was 
possible for us, using basic principles very far removed from those of Newton, to do justice to the entire range 
of the data of experience in a manner even more complete and satisfactory than was possible with Newton’s 
principles. But quite apart from the question of comparative merits, the fi ctitious character of the principles 
is made quite obvious by the fact that it is possible to exhibit two essentially different bases, each of which 
in its consequences leads to a large measure of agreement with experience. This indicates that any attempt 
logically to derive the basic concepts and laws of mechanics from the ultimate data of experience is doomed 
to failure” (Einstein, 1934, p. 166, emphasis added).
20 For a comparative analysis of Duhem’s and Quine’s theses, see Vuillemin (1998).
21 Commenting back on “Two dogmas”, Quine wrote: “In a footnote to ‘Two Dogmas’ I noted Duhem’s priority 
in stressing holism. As a matter of curiosity, however, I might mention that when I wrote and presented ‘Two 
Dogmas’ [...] I didn’t know about Duhem. Both Hempel and Philipp Frank subsequently brought Duhem to 
my attention, so I inserted the footnote when ‘Two Dogmas’ was reprinted in From a Logical Point of View” 
(1991, p. 269).
22 See Carnap (1967).
23 Quine’s reading of the Aufbau has been contested in the recent literature: see Michael Friedman (1999) and 
Alan Richardson (1998). These authors emphasize Carnap’s neo-Kantianism: the Aufbau, on their reading, was 
an attempt to explain all knowledge in logical terms only, without the pure concepts of the understanding 
which were at the heart of Kant’s metaphysics. 
24 See Carnap (1936, 1937), and Quine (1969, p. 77); see also Carnap’s Preface to the second edition of the 
Aufbau (1967, p. viii).
25 See also Quine (1969, p. 76-77).
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Carnap lists a set of desiderata that need to be fulfilled in order for the reduction 
to take place. Those desiderata concern the reduction of sentences expressing per-
ceptions of colors to sentences assigning colors objectively to space-time points. 
The sections are meant to illustrate how the reduction of scientific sentences in 
general is supposed to take place and they mark what Carnap calls the passage 
from the “autopsychological” realm to the objective world. They attempt to show 
how solipsistic, or subjective, constructions of sensations and experiences can be 
assigned objective space-time points. By specifying a recipe, however sketchy, for 
making those assignments, it would show how to reduce all statements about color 
properties to statements comprising only logical terms and terms for sense-data and 
provide a guide for the assignment of other types of sensations and experiences 
to the objective world. Carnap lists 11 desiderata in § 126, which are subsequently 
supplemented (§ 127 contains an alternative presentation of the same material).
The idea is to assign each color sensation to a certain space-time point, and 
assign colors to all the remaining space-time points so as to maximize the overall 
continuity and simplicity of the system of space-time points, at least inasmuch as 
colors are concerned. If, for example, the color red is assigned to point p at time t, 
and the same assignment is made a few minutes later, then in the time interval in 
between those two assignments we should assume that point p remained red, un-
less some other assignments determine otherwise. Thus, desideratum 10 says that 
[W]e have to assign a color to the unseen color spots. Taking into account the colors 
of seen color spots, we make a preliminary choice of these colors in such a way that 
the color of the points of a world line, considered as a function of time, shows a 
rate of change which is as small as possible, i.e., if possible, remains constant (1967, 
p. 196-197).
Likewise, as new sensations are had and new assignments are made, previous 
assignments may need to be revised accordingly, always attempting to maximize 
the overall continuity and simplicity of the assignments. Since the desiderata listed 
by Carnap are meant to provide a general recipe for specifying which color sensa-
tion is at each space-time point, they can be understood as providing instructions 
for reducing the relation “is at” to logical terms and terms for sense data. As Quine 
points out, however, the intended reduction cannot obtain even in principle:
Carnap did not seem to recognize [...] that his treatment of physical objects fell short 
of reduction not merely through sketchiness, but in principle. Statements of the form 
‘Quality q is at point-instant x;y;z;t’ were, according to his canons, to be apportioned 
truth values in such a way as to maximize and minimize certain over-all features, and 
with growth of experience the truth values were to be progressively revised in the 
same spirit. I think this is a good schematization (deliberately oversimplifi ed, to be 
sure) of what science really does; but it provides no indication, not even the sketchi-
est, of how a statement of the form ‘Quality q is at x;y;z;t’ could ever be translated 
into Carnap’s initial language of sense data and logic. The connective ‘is at’ remains 
an added undefi ned connective; the canons counsel us in its use but not in its elimi-
nation (1980, p. 40).
Furthermore, Carnap does not give any indication of the relative weight of each 
desideratum. Hence, conflicting desiderata may in principle yield conflicting assign-
ments of colors to objective space-time points. More importantly for our purposes 
here, the assignment of colors to space-time points cannot be executed one at a time, 
since some assignments are dependent on others. If a certain color sensation is an 
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hallucination, for example, there is no corresponding assignment to be made in the 
objective space-time. But whether a sensation is an hallucination can only be judged 
by comparing it to other sensations that are not hallucinatory. Hence, the assign-
ments of colors to objective space-time points cannot be made one by one. Rather, 
they must be holistic and proceed from the totality of sensations (or a very large 
number of them) to the totality of objective space-time points (or a large portion of 
them). However, since the totality of color-sensations is never completely given, one 
can never be sure that the assignments made up to a given time will not have to be 
revised later in the light of new sensations. Thus, one can never actually reduce, one 
by one, the sentences containing assignments of color to objective space-time points 
to a sentence containing only terms for sense-data and logical terms. 
To his credit, this is a point which Carnap seems soon to have acknowledged, 
since in later writings he proposes a reduction of a slightly laxer kind. In “Testability 
and meaning” (1936, 1937), for example, he puts forth the weaker notion of ‘reduc-
tion form’ as an alternative to the explicit definitions proposed as instruments of 
reduction in the Aufbau. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the Logical syntax of language 
[1937], Carnap explicitly endorses Duhem’s confirmation holism: 
[...] it is not possible to lay down any set rules as to how new primitive laws are to 
be established on the basis of actually stated protocol-sentences. [...] Further, it is 
in general impossible to test even a single hypothetical sentence. In the case of a 
single sentence of this kind, there are in general no suitable L-consequences of the 
form of protocol-sentences; hence for the deduction of sentences having the form of 
protocol-sentences the remaining hypotheses must also be used. Thus the test applies, 
at bottom, not to a single hypothesis but to the whole system of physics as a system 
of hypotheses (Duhem, Poincaré).
No rule of the physical language is defi nitive; all rules are laid down with the reservation 
that they may be altered as soon as it seems expedient to do so. This applies not only 
to the P-rules but also to the L-rules, including those of mathematics. In this respect, 
there are only differences in degree; certain rules are more diffi cult to renounce than 
others (2002, p. 316-317).
Incidentally, Quine lectured on the philosophy of Carnap in 1934 (see Quine, 
1990a) and may have picked up the gist of the reasons for holism from Carnap himself. 
Confirmation holism lends credence to 
underdetermination
Confirmation holism, even in its more modest version defended by Quine 
after “Two dogmas”, suggests the plausibility of a stronger one, the thesis of un-
derdetermination. 
If in the face of adverse observations we are free always to choose among various 
adequate modifi cations of our theory, then presumably all possible observations are 
insuffi cient to determine theory uniquely (1975, p. 313).
The reasoning here seems clear enough on a first approximation: each “ad-
equate” modification would yield a new theory which is compatible with observa-
tions in that it does not imply observation categoricals that are known to be false. 
Since various new theories are thus made possible, the observations available at 
any given moment cannot, on their own, determine one theory above all others. 
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This, however, is not yet the thesis of underdetermination, but just an immediate 
consequence of confirmation holism itself.26 Underdetermination further enjoins 
us to entertain the unlikely possibility of two theories that imply exactly the same 
observation categoricals and yet differ from one another at the level of theoretical 
sentences. Quine thinks of the thesis in connection to what he often calls – following 
Newton – “systems of the world”, that is, global theories, or theories of everything, 
sufficiently general in scope to encompass not only all given observations but all 
possible ones, insofar as sense can be made of that notion. Underdetermination 
thus seems a stronger thesis than confirmation holism, because of its use of the 
notion of ‘empirical equivalence’ even beyond the limits of testability. However, for 
Quine, underdetermination would always remain somewhat “beset with obscurities” 
in ways that confirmation holism is not. The latter is confirmed by the practices of 
experimental scientists; no such confirmation is available for underdetermination, 
since that could only happen if we had at least two rival systems of the world which 
were not only correct but also empirically equivalent. 
Quine’s most important analysis of underdetermination was laid out in 
Quine (1975), which purports to “explore its meaning and its limits” (p. 313). 
The essay begins with a presentation of confirmation holism and argues that it “lends 
credence” to the thesis of underdetermination. The paper reformulates the thesis 
of underdetermination itself and presents the rivalry which empirically equivalent 
theories can be thought to have as cases of non-intertranslatability. The thesis then 
says that we cannot rule out the possibility of us finding empirically equivalent 
theories which we will systematically fail to render empirically equivalent through 
reconstrual of predicates, or translation (1975, p. 328). In this regard, the so-called 
thesis of underdetermination is not much more than a conjecture. As such, it is 
weaker than confirmation holism, at least in the sense that as a conjecture it cannot, 
on its own, entail or support any significant doctrine in epistemology or metaphys-
ics. Furthermore, confirmation holism alone cannot establish underdetermination, 
and in (1975) Quine offers two main reasons why it cannot: 
(i) Given confirmation holism, we have reason to expect that various theories 
can be designed to conform to a given set of observations. “Adequate modifications” 
can yield new theories which are consistent with observations in the sense that they 
do not entail observation categoricals that are known to be false. However, those 
“adequate modifications” of a theory could, for all we know, each imply a differ-
ent, or perhaps a new set of observation categoricals. The revised theories, in other 
words, might not end up being empirically equivalent. In fact, that is to be expected, 
since revisions of different hypotheses are likely to affect the implied observation 
categoricals in different manners. Hence, even though the new theories may each 
be compatible with the observations that led to the revisions of the original theory, 
they may not be compatible with future observations, or past events that went 
unobserved. Hence, they fail as cases of underdetermination.
(ii) Even if the new theories, produced by “adequate modifications” of an older 
theory, were all empirically equivalent, one cannot thereby conclude that they are in 
fact distinct theories. Since they presumably agree on all observation categoricals, 
whatever differences they may have must be confined to sentences that hinge on 
observations only indirectly, that is, the so-called theoretical sentences. But then 
one cannot in principle exclude the possibility that all the new theories produced 
by that revision process are not only empirically equivalent but in fact versions of 
26 Some authors, for example, Sklar (1975, 1981) and Stanford (2001) – refer to this thesis as “transient 
underdetermination”. It is not clear, however, how that thesis differs from holism. See Hoefer and Rosenberg 
(1994) for discussion of this particular point. 
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the same theory, which can be rendered logically equivalent by “reconstrual of 
predicates”, or translation. A physical theory in which all occurrences of “proton” 
and “electron” are interchanged is indeed empirically equivalent to the original 
theory in which those terms are not interchanged. The two theories, however, can 
be clearly rendered logically equivalent by translating both into the vernacular 
English of technical physics. This is a fairly trivial case. In principle, however, more 
complicated cases might also turn out to be likewise intertranslatable, even if a 
manual of translation is hard to come by.
Holism is thus insufficient to establish underdetermination.27 The latter 
can only obtain if not only alternative ways of revising a theory can render it 
compatible with a given set of observations, but also if the resulting theories 
are empirically equivalent but cannot be rendered logically equivalent through 
intertranslation. There are considerable difficulties in demonstrating that this is 
possible even in principle, and for that reason Quine tended to treat the thesis 
as a conjecture (see, e.g., 1981, p. 181). Whether there are empirically equiva-
lent systems of the world that are not intertranslatable, he wrote, is an “open 
question” (1975, p. 327). Also open is the question whether, upon finding such 
theories and failing to intertranslate them, that failure is to be accounted on 
our lack of ingenuity or on intrinsic features of the two theories that would 
prevent any intertranslation in principle (1975, p. 328). Underdetermination, in 
other words, although plausible on a first approximation, cannot be asserted 
as categorically as confirmation holism can.
Some implications of the two theses
Within Quine’s philosophy, confirmation holism has far-reaching consequenc-
es, despite its trivial justification. Quine argued that it provides good reasons to 
reject the idea of a realm of epistemologically privileged sentences – say, “analytic” 
or “a priori” sentences – which would be immune to revision or true in virtue of 
meaning or necessarily true. All the sentences that make up the corpus of a scientific 
theory are justified by the net empirical implications of that theory. If the synthetic 
observation categoricals implied by the theory are confirmed, so are all the sen-
tences that comprise the theory, however removed they might be from observations. 
The thesis thus entails that the traditional distinctions between the various branches 
of science must be quite plastic, and that even the traditional distinctions between 
metaphysics and science, and between empirical claims and theoretical claims are 
rather arbitrary. Confirmation holism thus supports some substantial theses which 
are at the core of Quine’s philosophy, including meaning holism (the thesis that 
isolated sentences do not in general have empirical content).
Quine used this in his justification of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation: 
[I]f the English sentences of a theory have their meaning only together as a body, then 
we can justify their translation into Arunta only together as a body. There will be no 
justifi cation for pairing off the component English sentences with component Arunta 
sentences, except as these correlations make the translation of the theory as a whole 
come out right. Any translations of the English sentences into Arunta sentences will 
be as correct as any other, so long as the net empirical implications of the theory as 
a whole are preserved in translation (1969, p. 80).
27 Quine is frequently misread on this point: Laudan (1990, p. 271 ff.) and Kitcher (1993, p. 251), for example, 
suggest that for Quine underdetermination is “grounded” on holism.
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Indeterminacy of translation, like underdetermination, is a rather controversial 
thesis in the secondary literature. As is the case with underdetermination, it has also 
been frequently misunderstood. Besides unnerving commentators, the two theses 
share another interesting parallel: neither categorically affirms its peculiar form of 
indeterminacy. Quine distinguishes the thesis of indeterminacy of translation from 
ontological relativity (or indeterminacy of terms). The latter, he wrote, admits of trivial 
proof: “The essence of the proof is just that x is an F if and only if the proxy of x is 
the proxy of an F” (1998b, p. 728). The former, on the other hand, is a conjecture.28 
In this regard the thesis of underdetermination is similar to the thesis of indeter-
minacy of translation (or indeterminacy of sentences, or “holophrastic meaning”).
The thesis of underdetermination, because of its conjectural status, cannot, 
on its own, support the weight of substantial doctrines. This is a point on which 
Quine is widely misread. The following passage, by Laudan and Leplin, illustrates 
well the misunderstanding in question: 
By the 1920s, it was widely supposed that a perfectly general proof was available for 
the thesis that there are always empirically equivalent rivals to any successful theory. 
[...] [B]y the 1940s and 1950s, it was thought that – in large part because of empiri-
cal equivalence – theory choice was radically underdetermined by any conceivable 
evidence. Whole theories of knowledge (e.g., W. V. Quine’s) have been constructed 
on the presumption that these results are sound (1991, p. 449).
It is certainly true that confirmation holism (alongside empiricism and natural-
ism) plays a fundamental role in Quine’s theory of knowledge. Underdetermination, 
given its rather conjectural justification, cannot play such role. The thesis suggests 
that alternative descriptions of the world may turn out to be equally tenable. But 
this is not an implication which can be asserted categorically within Quine’s phi-
losophy. Rather, the possibility of rival theories of the world which are empirically 
equivalent and yet non-intertranslatable remains “an open question” (1975, p. 327). 
Given holism and the “less-than-rigid” connections that seem to obtain between 
theories and observations, it is to remain a plausible conjecture, however. In later 
works, Quine vacillated on what to make of this conjecture. In Quine (1990b and 
again in 1992), he discusses two alternatives: one is to hold rival underdetermined 
theories as equally true, the other to hold only our current theory as true and all 
alternatives as false or meaningless. The former he calls the “ecumenical” attitude, 
the latter – which he eventually settled for – is the “dogmatic” attitude.29
In Quine (1975), he takes underdetermination to hold an important lesson 
for our attitudes towards science: however certain we may be of the correctness of 
the theories we hold, however well those theories may be supported by observa-
tions, there may always be room for “undiscovered systematic alternatives” (1975, 
p. 327) which may remain forever undetected. Symptomatically, the lesson Quine 
derives from underdetermination concerns our attitudes toward science, and not 
any metaphysical or epistemological doctrine. 
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